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Introduction and summary
Banks are generally failed and placed in receivership
when the value of their assets declines below the value
of their deposits and other debt, so that the value of
their capital (net worth) becomes negative. The losses
exceed the ability of the stockholders to absorb them.
As a result, some of their creditors, and in the United
States also the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation
(FDIC), which stands in the shoes of, at minimum,
the insured depositors up to the insurance coverage
ceiling, are likely to suffer losses. Because the FDIC
is a federal government agency, if losses from bank
failure resolutions are sufficiently high to exceed both
the FDIC’s reserves and its ability to collect additional
revenues by levying sufficient premiums on insured
banks to replenish the reserve fund, the losses may
need to be paid by the government and thereby the tax-
payers. Indeed, taxpayers were required to pay some
$150 billion when losses incurred by the former in-
surer of deposits at savings and loan associations (S&Ls),
the Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation
(FSLIC), in resolving the large number of failures in
the S&L crisis of the 1980s exceeded its financial ca-
pacity to protect all insured deposits at these institutions
against loss. Thus, the FDIC loss rate in resolutions
is of concern to the uninsured depositors and other
bank creditors who share in the loss with the FDIC,
to the banks that pay insurance premiums, and to the
taxpayers that are widely perceived to have backup
liability.1 It is in the best interest of all of these parties
that the FDIC minimize its losses in failure resolutions.
Indeed, it is the losses from bank failures more than
the bank failures themselves that are most damaging to
both most stakeholders of the failed banks and the FDIC,
so that it is more important to minimize this loss rate
than the number of bank failures. Inefficient or unlucky
banks that become insolvent should be permitted if
not encouraged to exit, but with minimum losses.
In this article, I review both the causes of resolu-
tion losses to the FDIC and recent legislative and regula-
tory initiatives intended to reduce such losses, compute the
loss rates experienced by the FDIC from 1980 through
2002, and compare and analyze the losses before and
after the enactment of the FDIC Improvement Act
(FDICIA) at year-end 1991, which, among other things,
was intended to minimize such losses. I find that al-
though the number of bank failures declined sharply
after the implementation of FDICIA in 1993, the FDIC’s
loss rate increased significantly. This disturbing conclu-
sion holds even after adjustment for changes in the size
distribution of failed banks in the two periods. Only
when the failed high-loss larger banks in the second
period are also removed from the observations does the
loss rate in the post-FDICIA period decline below that
of the pre-FDICIA period. I conclude the article with
speculation on why the FDIC’s loss rate may have
failed to decline and recommendations for enhancing
the likelihood of loss reductions in the future.
These losses, however, are not necessarily the sole
fault of the FDIC. Banks in the United States are de-
clared insolvent and put into receivership or conser-
vatorship under the FDIC by their chartering or primary
federal regulatory agency, which is generally not the
FDIC. Thus, the overall loss rate is in part determined
by the embedded negative net worth of the bank at
the time it is declared insolvent by these agencies and
handed over to the FDIC.214 3Q/2004, Economic Perspectives
Causes of FDIC losses
Unlike most other firms, chartered banks in the
United States are not failed and placed into receiver-
ship by the federal bankruptcy courts and are not sub-
ject to the federal bankruptcy code.3 Rather, they are
failed and placed in receivership (or conservatorship
if the institution is to be kept operating by the FDIC
on a temporary basis) by their chartering or primary
federal regulatory agency and are subject to the pro-
visions of the Federal Deposit Insurance Act (FDIA).
These differ significantly from the provisions of the
corporate bankruptcy code.4 The FDIC is generally
appointed as the receiver, and the depositors and other
creditors have no representation.5 The loss rate to the
FDIC in bank failure resolutions is determined by a
number of factors, including how quickly a bank is
placed in receivership or conservatorship after its net
worth declines below zero, the relative importance of
general creditors and uninsured depositors on the
balance sheet, and the ability of the FDIC as receiver
to sell the bank or its assets at the highest present val-
ue price. The longer insolvent, negative net worth banks
are permitted to remain open and in operation under
their existing management, either as a result of inad-
equate monitoring or forbearance by bank regulators,
the larger their losses are likely to be on average. These
institutions are likely to continue the inefficient oper-
ations that contributed to their insolvency and/or in-
crease their risk taking and “gamble for resurrection.”
As the insolvent shareholders have no remaining in-
vestment in the bank, if they win their gamble they keep
all the gains and possibly the bank and, if they lose, they
lose their creditors’ funds, not their own. On average,
these bets are unlikely to pay off. Regulatory forbear-
ance and inadequate monitoring have been costly in
the past (Bartholomew, 1991; and Barth, Bartholomew,
and Bradley, 1990; and Kaufman, 1995). The FDIA
provides broad discretion to regulators in declaring
an institution insolvent, but as amended by FDICIA
requires an insured institution to be resolved within
a brief period after its tangible equity declines to not
less than, at minimum, 2 percent of its total assets.
Resolution losses to the FDIC are equal to the
difference between the sum of the present value of the
par value of insured deposits and of the recovery claim
of uninsured deposits or non-deposit debt plus any
protection that the FDIC decides to provide against loss
at the insolvent bank being resolved and the lower
present value of the recovery value of the bank as a
whole or in parts. The lower any protection provided
on uninsured claims and the larger the relative size of
these claims, the more the FDIC is able to share any
given resolution losses with others and reduce the
size of the losses it bears.
The ability of the FDIC to protect uninsured
claims and with whom and in what amounts it can
share resolution losses are prescribed by law. Since
the Depositor Preference Act of 1993, the FDIC’s
claim has had equal standing in liquidation with un-
insured deposits at domestic offices of insured banks
and priority over deposits at foreign offices of in-
sured U.S. banks, general creditors, and other unse-
cured claimants. Before 1993, the FDIC had equal
standing with all depositors and non-subordinated
general creditors and priority only over subordinated
creditors and equity claimants. Thus, for any given
gross loss rate on a bank failure since 1993 and, in
the absence of any protection of uninsured non-do-
mestic deposit claimants, the larger the relative im-
portance of non-domestic deposits and of general or
subordinated creditors, the lower is the net loss rate
to the FDIC. (The potential loss to the FDIC in re-
solving insolvencies with different liability structures
is analyzed further in the appendix.)
Although the FDIC is required to protect all in-
sured deposits at resolved banks fully against loss from
par value, it has greater discretion in protecting unin-
sured deposits and other claims. Indeed, from 1980
through the enactment of FDICIA at year-end 1991, the
FDIC effectively protected all uninsured deposits at all
large resolved banks and, at times, even not very large
banks and most non-deposit creditor claims (Benston
and Kaufman, 1997).6 The FDIC’s discretion was re-
duced considerably but not eliminated altogether by
FDICIA, a primary purpose of which was “to resolve
the problems of insured depository institutions at least
possible long-term cost to the deposit insurance fund.”
In general, FDICIA prohibits the FDIC from protect-
ing any uninsured claims if doing so increases its losses,
but there are exceptions. However, the exceptions are
substantially more difficult for the FDIC to apply. To
obtain a systemic risk exception (SRE), the FDIC must
make a recommendation to the Secretary of the Trea-
sury that not protecting some or all uninsured claims
at a failed bank “would have serious adverse effects
on economic conditions or financial stability and …
[providing partial or complete protection] would
avoid or mitigate such adverse effects.”
The recommendation to the Secretary must be made
in writing by a vote of no less than two-thirds of both
the board of directors of the FDIC and the Board of
Governors of the Federal Reserve System. The Secretary
must then make the determination in consultation
with the President. The Secretary must also maintain
all documentation and notify the House and Senate15 Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago
banking committees. The basis for the determination
and any subsequent actions are required to be reviewed
by Congress’ General Accounting Office (GAO). Fur-
thermore, if the FDIC suffers any losses from providing
the protection, the losses must be repaid expeditiously
by all banks through a special FDIC assessment based
on asset size. Thus, the cost of the protection is paid
by the banks and is not passed through to the taxpay-
ers. These provisions may be expected to significantly
reduce the likelihood of FDIC protection for uninsured
claimants, and since 1992 the FDIC has protected unin-
sured depositors only in a very few instances at small
banks, where the acquiring bank bid a premium to assume
the small amount of uninsured deposits that was greater
than the pro-rata loss on these deposits.7 In addition,
in these resolutions, the FDIC avoided the costs of
identifying and separating the insured and uninsured
deposits on the bank’s books.8 Thus, protecting the
uninsured deposits in these instances did not increase
the FDIC’s losses and was consistent with least cost
resolution (Benston and Kaufman, 1997).9
Lastly, the higher the present value price received by
the FDIC as receiver from the sale of the insolvent bank
as a whole or in parcels, the lower is its loss. This may in-
volve a tradeoff between waiting to sell the assets in a
potentially stronger market at a higher future price that
must be discounted back to the date of resolution and
selling quickly at a lower price that requires less dis-
counting. Evidence from the experience of both the U.S.
in the 1980s and early 1990s and other countries suggests
that, although not politically popular, quicker sales and
resolutions, on average, achieve higher present values
than delayed sales and resolutions, even in periods of
widespread bank difficulties (Barth, 1991; Bartholomew,
1993; Ely and Varaiya, 1996; and Kane, 1990).
FDIC losses
The 1980s saw the largest number of bank and
S&L failures in the U.S. since the Great Depression
of the 1930s. Between 1983 and 1990, some 1,150
commercial banks, representing 8 percent of the in-
dustry in 1980, and some 900 S&Ls, representing fully
25 percent of the industry in 1980, failed and were put
in receivership (Kaufman, 1995). Moreover, the asso-
ciated combined losses to uninsured depositors, other
stakeholders, and the FSLIC and FDIC were the high-
est in U.S. history. As noted earlier, the aggregate
losses from the S&L failures alone exceeded the finan-
cial resources of the FSLIC to protect all insured de-
positors at its failed institutions and required an injection
of some $150 billion of taxpayer funds. As a result,
the FSLIC was dissolved by Congress and its deposit
insurance functions transferred to a new Savings
Association Insurance Fund (SAIF) housed in the FDIC.
The increase in S&L failures occurred before the
increase in bank failures. When the number and size of
bank failures picked up in the late 1980s and losses to the
FDIC mounted, there was widespread fear that the banks
would go the way of the S&Ls and the FDIC the way
of the FSLIC. In response, Congress enacted FDICIA
at year-end 1991. Among other provisions, FDICIA
attempts to reduce losses to the FDIC from failure resolu-
tion by encouraging bank regulators to intervene sooner
and more effectively in financially troubled banks to
prevent their failure through prompt corrective action
(PCA). And, if the intervention was unsuccessful, FDICIA
authorized the FDIC to resolve these banks before their
book net worth turned negative and, with the systemic
risk exception noted above, not to protect any claims
other than insured deposits if this would increase its
losses and be inconsistent with least-cost resolution
(LCR). The remainder of the article considers how
successful this legislation and the bank regulators
have been in reducing losses from failure resolutions.
Table 1 (overleaf) shows the losses incurred by the
FDIC in 1,645 bank failures from 1980 though 2002.10
Total losses in this period were $38.5 billion. As a per-
centage of the sum of on-balance-sheet bank assets on
the date each bank was failed, losses averaged 12 per-
cent. This is the loss rate to the FDIC. The table also
shows aggregate losses by bank size. Most failed banks
were small. Eighty percent had assets of less then $100
million and another 15 percent had assets between
$100 and $500 million. Less than 1 percent of failed
banks had assets in excess of $5 billion. The average
aggregate loss rate varied with size. It was highest for
small banks with assets of under $100 million and de-
clined progressively with asset size from 21 percent to
6 percent for banks with assets in excess of $5 billion.11
Although the loss rate was lowest for the largest banks,
total dollar losses per bank were by far the largest at
nearly $765 million at these banks, compared with only
$6 million for banks with under $100 million in as-
sets. Indeed, the largest 1 percent of all bank failures
accounted for 20 percent of the FDIC’s total losses.
Because more small than large banks failed, the
loss rate computed as an average of individual bank
loss rates—average of ratios, where each bank is
weighted equally regardless of its size—was consid-
erably higher at 21 percent. The rate again tended to
decline with bank size. However, individual bank loss
rates varied considerably, ranging from a low of 0 per-
cent to a high of 75 percent in the failure of the First
National Bank of Keystone (WV) in 1999, 72 percent
in the failure of the BestBank (CO) in 1998, and 71
percent for WestPoint National Bank (San Antonio,
TX) in 1988.12 As can be seen from tables 2 and 3,16 3Q/2004, Economic Perspectives
only 5 percent of all failures were resolved by the
FDIC with effectively no loss and less than 25 per-
cent with a loss of less than 10 percent of assets.
To examine the impact of FDICIA on FDIC
losses in bank resolution, I divided the bank failures
into a pre-FDICIA period (1980–92) and a post-FDICIA
period (1993–2002).13 The number of bank failures
declined sharply in the later period from 1,551 to only
94. The average individual bank loss rate declined
slightly from 21.2 percent to 18.6 percent, and the per-
centage of failures resolved with a loss of 10 percent
or less increased from 22.4 percent to 31.9 percent.
But the average aggregate loss rate to the FDIC more
than doubled from 11.6 percent in the first period to
24.3 percent in the second, and the average loss per
bank increased from $23.1 million to $28.8 million.
Only for the smallest banks—those with assets of un-
der $100 million—did the average loss rate not increase.
TABLE 1
FDIC losses on failure of BIF insured banks, 1980–2002
Bank assets ($millions)
Under 100 100–500 500–1,000 1,000–5,000 Over 5,000 Total
1980–2002
Number of banksa 1,313 241 42 39 10 1,645
Percent of number 79.82 14.65 2.55 2.37 0.61 100
Assets ($millions) 37,722 51,937 27,911 77,700 125,818 321,088
Percent of assets 11.75 16.18 8.69 24.20 39.18 100
Loss ($millions) 8,029 9,172 3,681 9,990 7,651 38,523
Percent of loss 20.84 23.81 9.56 25.93 19.86 100
Loss/assets (%) 21.28 17.66 13.19 12.86 6.08 12.00
Average of bank
  loss ratios (%) 22.30 17.33 12.97 13.84 7.26 21.04
Loss per bank ($millions) 6.11 38.06 87.64 256.15 765.10 23.42
1980–92
Number of banks 1,247 217 40 37 10 1,551
Percent of number 80.40 13.99 2.58 2.39 0.64 100
Assets ($millions) 35,329 47,144 26,296 75,354 125,818 309,941
Percent of assets 11.40 15.21 8.48 24.31 40.59 100
Loss ($millions) 7,610 8,252 3,264 9,035 7,651 35,812
Percent of loss 21.25 23.04 9.11 25.23 21.36 100
Loss/assets (%) 21.54 17.50 12.41 11.99 6.08 11.55
Average of bank
  loss ratios (%) 22.56 17.15 12.23 12.21 7.26 21.19
Loss per bank ($millions) 6.10 38.03 81.60 244.2 765.10 23.09
1993–2002
Number of banks 66 24 2 2 0 94
Percent of number 70.21 25.53 2.13 2.13 0 100
Assets ($millions) 2,393 4,793 1,615 2,346 0 11,147
Percent of assets 21.47 43.00 14.49 21.04 0 100
Loss ($millions) 419 921 417 955 0 2,711
Percent of loss 15.44 33.95 15.38 35.23 0 100
Loss/assets (%) 17.49 19.20 25.82 40.71 0 24.32
Average of bank
  loss ratios (%) 17.48 18.93 27.82 44.02 0 18.63
Loss per bank ($millions) 6.35 38.38 208.50 477.50 0 28.84
Loss rate for asset distribution
  in 1980–92b (%) 2.00 2.92 2.19 9.89 0 17.00
Loss rate omitting
  2 outliersc (%) 17.49 19.20 12.79 13.46 0 17.35
Size normalized loss rate
  omitting 2 outliersa (%) 2.00 2.92 1.08 3.27 0 9.27
aAll failed FDIC insured institutions from 1980 through 1989 and all failed BIF insured institutions 1990–2002. Omits 12 banks for
which complete data are not available (11 banks in 1980–92 period and one bank in 1993–2002 period).
bComputed by weighting loss rates in 1993–2002 by percent asset distribution in 1980–92.
cOmits First National Bank of Keystone (WV) and NextBank (AZ).
Source: FDIC.17 Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago
Moreover, the FDIC loss rate in the second period
likely understates the total losses suffered by all claim-
ants in bank failures relative to the FDIC loss rate in
the pre-1992 period. As noted earlier, FDICIA required
the FDIC to share any losses with uninsured claim-
ants, and depositor preference gave the FDIC priority
over nondeposit creditors. This reduced its losses at
the expense of these claimants. In contrast, before
FDICIA, the FDIC frequently protected all uninsured
claimants, particularly at larger banks, and absorbed
the total loss (Benston and Kaufman, 1997, and 1998).
Thus, its losses would have been larger for the same
total loss from a bank failure.
The increase in loss to the FDIC in the post-FDICIA
period appears to be inconsistent with both the intent of
FDICIA and other legislative and regulatory initiatives
in this period and the considerably smaller number of
failures, which should have given the regulators more
time to devote to each troubled bank under PCA before
insolvency to design an LCR solution at insolvency
(Eisenbeis and Wall, 2003). The increase suggests that
the legislation may have been flawed and ineffective
and/or that the regulators failed to vigorously imple-
ment its provisions. But the increase in loss rates may
also be attributed to other factors, including a change
in the size distribution of failed banks and a change
in the incidence of major fraud or gross mismanage-
ment as a cause of bank failure.
As noted, loss rates vary with size of bank, so that
the average loss rate can change between two periods
if the size composition of the failed banks changed,
even if the loss rate in each size category did not.
Table 1 shows that, proportionately, somewhat fewer
very small—high loss rate—and very large—low loss
rate—banks failed in the post-FDICIA period than in
the pre-FDICIA period.14 No very large banks (assets
in excess of $5 billion) failed in the latter period. The
relative increases were largest in the next to smallest
category of banks. It is possible to estimate the im-
pact on the loss rate of the change in the failed bank
size distribution by weighting the loss rate in each of
the five size classifications in the second period by the
percentage of assets in banks that failed in that size
group in the first period. When asset size distribution
is held constant, so that the same asset size distribu-
tion of failed banks is assumed for the post-FDICIA
period as occurred in the pre-FDICIA period, the ag-
gregate average loss rate in the post-FDICIA period
declines from 24 percent to 17 percent. But this is still
considerably higher than the 12 percent in the earlier
period and primarily reflects the absence of large low-
loss banks in the second period. Thus, standardizing
TABLE 2
Distribution of bank loss rates by bank size, 1980–2002
Loss rate (%)
Bank assets ($millions) 0–1 1.1–10 10.1–20 20.1–30 30.1–40 40.1–50 50.1–60 Above 60 Total
(number of banks)
Entire period: 1980–2002
Under 100 49 197 371 362 195 93 28 18 1,313
100–500 30 57 70 40 24 14 3 3 241
500–1,000 5 13 13 7 3 1 0 0 42
1,000–5,000 2 17 10 8 1 0 0 1 39
5,000 or greater 1 6 2 1 0 0 0 0 10
Total 87 290 466 418 223 108 31 22 1,645
Period 1: 1980–1992
Under 100 44 179 349 352 188 91 28 16 1,247
100–500 30 50 60 38 21 13 3 2 217
500–1,000 5 13 12 7 3 0 0 0 40
1,000–5,000 2 17 9 8 1 0 0 0 37
5,000 or greater 1 6 2 1 0 0 0 0 10
Total 82 265 432 406 213 104 31 18 1,551
Period 2: 1992–2002
Under 100 5 18 22 10 7 2 0 2 66
100–500 0 7 10 2 3 1 0 1 24
500–1,000 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 2
1,000–5,000 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 2
5,000 or greater 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Total 5 25 34 12 10 4 0 4 94
Source: FDIC.18 3Q/2004, Economic Perspectives
for size differences in the two sub-periods reduces but
does not eliminate the increase in the FDIC loss rate.
Fraud is a major cause of bank failures in all pe-
riods, but may be expected to be relatively more impor-
tant in good economic times, when few banks fail for
economic reasons, than in bad economic times, when
more banks fail for economic reasons. Fraud is by defini-
tion difficult to detect before failure and can lead to very
large losses before it is detected relative to losses from
other causes, which are generally easier to detect and
to monitor. If so, losses from bank failures in the post-
FDICIA period, which generally coincided with prosper-
ous times, would be expected to be relatively higher
than in the pre-FDICIA period, when the economy did
not perform as well. In addition, a change in the size
distribution of failures due to major fraud or gross mis-
management leading to large operating losses can also
change the aggregate loss rate. If the presence of major
fraud or gross mismanagement may be proxied by large
losses, then there appears to be a slight increase in major
fraud and gross mismanagement at larger banks in the
post-FDICIA period. Two banks, First National Bank of
Keystone (WV) in 1999 and NextBank (AZ) in 2002,
with assets in excess of $500 million failed in the post-
FDICIA period with loss rates in excess of 40 percent—
the costliest 10 percent of all failures—compared
TABLE 3
Percent distribution of bank loss rates by bank size, 1980–2002
Loss rate (%)
Bank assets ($millions) 0–1 1.1–10 10.1–20 20.1–30 30.1–40 40.1–50 50.1–60 Above 60 Total
(percent of banks in each size group)
Entire period: 1980–2002
Under 100 3.73 15.00 28.26 27.57 14.85 7.08 2.14 1.37 100.00
100–500 12.45 23.65 29.05 16.60 9.96 5.81 1.24 1.24 100.00
500–1,000 11.90 30.95 30.95 16.67 7.14 2.38 0.00 0.00 100.00
1,000–5,000 5.13 43.59 25.64 20.51 2.56 0.00 0.00 2.56 100.00
5,000 or greater 10.00 60.00 20.00 10.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 100.00
Total 5.29 17.63 28.33 25.41 13.56 6.57 1.88 1.34 100.00
Period 1: 1980–92
Under 100 3.53 14.35 27.99 28.23 15.08 7.30 2.25 1.28 100.00
100–500 13.82 23.04 27.65 17.51 9.68 5.99 1.38 0.92 100.00
500–1,000 12.50 32.50 30.00 17.50 7.50 0.00 0.00 0.00 100.00
1,000–5,000 5.41 45.95 24.32 21.62 2.70 0.00 0.00 0.00 100.00
5,000 or greater 10.00 60.00 20.00 10.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 100.00
Total 5.29 17.09 27.85 26.18 13.73 6.71 2.00 1.16 100.00
Period 2: 1992–2002
Under 100 7.58 27.27 33.33 15.15 10.61 3.03 0.00 3.03 100.00
100–500 0.00 29.17 41.67 8.33 12.50 4.17 0.00 4.17 100.00
500–1,000 0.00 0.00 50.00 0.00 0.00 50.00 0.00 0.00 100.00
1,000–5,000 0.00 0.00 50.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 50.00 100.00
5,000 or greater 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 100.00
Total 5.32 26.60 36.17 12.77 10.64 4.26 0.00 4.26 100.00
Source: FDIC.
with no such failures in the pre-FDICIA period, although
the percentage of all failed banks with such large loss-
es remained about the same in both periods.15 These
two banks accounted for the average loss per bank
with assets between $500 million and $5 billion more
than doubling in the second period.
If these two banks are removed from the analysis,
the loss rate for the second period declines from 24.3
percent to 17.4 percent, but still remains significantly
higher than in the earlier period. Only if both these
two large-loss large banks are omitted and the second
period is adjusted for changes in the size distribution
of failed banks does the loss rate to the FDIC in the post-
FDICIA period decline below that of the pre-FDICIA
period. It declines to 9.3 percent. This suggests that both
an increase in fraud and gross mismanagement at larger
banks and a reduction in the overall number of very
large bank failures, which generally incur substantially
smaller loss rates, contributed to the increase in the
aggregate loss rate in the post-FDICIA period, despite
a decrease in the average individual bank loss rate.16
However, an analysis of the larger major fraud and
gross mismanagement cases in recent years, including
the analyses undertaken by the inspector generals of
the respective federal regulatory agencies required by19 Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago
FDICIA when the FDIC incurs material losses (defined
as the larger of $25 million or 2 percent of the resolved
bank’s total assets), suggests that, among other things,
the regulators either delayed on their own accord or
were delayed by legal or other actions initiated by the
target banks for considerable periods of time after the
fraud or mismanagement problems were first detected
(for example, Committee on Banking, 2002; U.S.
Department of Treasury, 2000, 2000a, and 2002b;
and FDIC, 2002). The larger the bank, the greater its
incentive to delay the regulators in identifying fraud
or gross mismanagement by adopting legal and other
challenges to their investigations. To the extent that
FDICIA emphasizes prompt corrective action by reg-
ulators, the high loss rate in the post-FDICIA period
suggests that the regulators need to improve, in particu-
lar, their means of detecting fraud and gross misman-
agement at larger banks and their reaction time in
responding to such evidence.17 The latter may require
additional legislative and regulatory authority from
Congress and possibly additional funding to reduce
delaying actions by target banks without reducing
appropriate due legal process or appeal procedures.
In almost all instances of large losses to the FDIC
in recent years, the failed bank reported very rapid
growth in assets, exceptionally high earnings on assets
and/or equity, and well above average capital ratios
shortly before its failure. Evidence over the past 25
years suggests that, while any one of these three mea-
sures in isolation does not signal problems and, in
the case of earnings and capital is desirable, in com-
bination all three represent a red warning flag (Duncan
et al., 2003). In many instances, the actual data were
significantly lower than the reported data as, among
other things, troubled banks under-reserved for loan
losses and overvalued other assets. Bank regulators
have often been reminded in these failures that “if
something looks too good to be true, it generally
isn’t true.” This suggests that regulators can benefit
by redeploying their examiners and supervisors to
these banks more rapidly and aggressively. Reducing
large losses at large banks is also important, because
these are the losses that can reduce the FDIC’s reserves
significantly and may lead to required increases in insur-
ance premiums on other banks, if the FDIC’s reserves
decline to less than 1.25 percent of insured deposits
as specified in FDICIA, or, if losses are sufficiently
large, even to taxpayer support, as in the late 1980s.
Conclusion
The analysis in this article suggests that a major ob-
jective of FDICIA of reducing the losses to the FDIC
from bank failures has not been fully realized to date,
despite a benign environment of few bank financial
problems and a decline in the average individual bank
loss rate. The large losses experienced by the FDIC
in the post-FDICIA period relative to the 1980–92
pre-FDICIA period result primarily from large losses
incurred in the resolution of a few larger banks. Nev-
ertheless, these are the losses that reduce the FDIC’s
reserve ratio significantly and are more likely to reduce
it below 1.25 percent. At this point, FDICIA requires
increases in insurance premiums to restore the ratio.
The large losses by the FDIC also indicate large losses
by uninsured depositors and other creditors at resolved
banks. As a result, the perception that bank failures have
high costs is more likely to be maintained and is like-
ly to increase support for public policies that focus on
reimbursing depositors at failed banks for their losses
rather than on reducing these losses through prompter
and more effective regulatory intervention, including
resolution before the bank’s capital is fully dissipated
as is envisioned in FDICIA. Because the latter is clearly
the preferred policy in terms of maximizing aggregate
social welfare, bank regulators may wish to focus their
attention more on uncovering evidence of fraud and
gross mismanagement at larger banks and to rely more
heavily on readily visible, low-cost red flags of danger,
such as unusually rapid growth rates and too-good-
to-be-true profitability, to allocate their resources to
reduce losses to the FDIC from smaller bank failures.
Again, it should be noted that, although the loss-
es are charged to the FDIC, they are not necessarily
the sole fault of the FDIC. Some of the losses were
likely to have already been embedded in the banks
when they were declared insolvent by their chartering
or primary federal regulatory agency and handed
over to the FDIC for resolution. Thus, part of the
fault lies with bank management and part with the
regulatory agency that declared the bank insolvent in
not resolving it sooner. The FDIC’s share of the loss
blame generally begins only after the institution has
become the FDIC’s responsibility. In addition, these
losses are not a condemnation of the PCA program in
general. Both the number of failures and the magnitude
of the losses may have been even greater in the absence
of the PCA provisions. Indeed, the agencies used the
powers of the program to successfully rehabilitate a
significant percentage of financially troubled institu-
tions before they became insolvent, thereby reducing
potential later losses from insolvency (Comptroller
of the Currency, 2003, and Salmon et al., 2003). If such
application successfully continues and the above sug-
gestions are adopted, at least in part, it is likely that
future losses to the FDIC would decline to rates more
consistent with the objectives of FDICIA.20 3Q/2004, Economic Perspectives
NOTES
1The FDIC Improvement Act of 1991 potentially reduces signifi-
cantly the backup liability of taxpayers for losses to the FDIC by
requiring it to raise insurance premiums on banks whenever its
reserves decline below 1.25 percent of total insured deposits, in
order to replenish the insurance fund to this ratio within one year.
The FDIC did not have this authority previously. Any taxpayer
liability is and has in the past been implicit—never explicitly
spelled out in legislation—but now is more likely to kick in only
if the FDIC is unable to raise sufficient funds from higher premi-
ums to keep the reserve ratio from declining below zero
(Kaufman, 2001 and 2002, and Kaufman and Wallison, 2001).
2Because agencies other than the FDIC do not have the responsibly
to reimburse depositors and other creditors of the banks they fail,
they do not have their own money at stake. Thus, they may have some
incentive to delay declaring a bank insolvent if they believe that
the additional time granted may help the bank regain solvency and
thereby remove a stain of failure on their watch from the record.
3Bank holding companies, in contrast, are failed and placed in re-
ceivership subject to the federal corporate bankruptcy code.
4An overview of the differences is discussed in Bliss and Kaufman
(2004). The difference in the bankruptcy process between chartered
banks and most other corporations has important i mplications for
both the timing of legal failure and the losses to uninsured depositors,
other creditors, and shareholders. Under FDICIA, the FDIC is sub-
ject to both a 2 percent tangible equity to assets closure rule and a
least cost resolution provision. In contrast, legal failure for other
firms generally occurs only after an actual (or, if voluntary, pend-
ing) default on a major scheduled debt or other payment, and bank-
ruptcy courts in the U.S. tend to stretch out the rehabilitation process
at high cost to creditors. Thus, it is reasonable to expect that in-
solvent banks are likely to be resolved sooner and with smaller losses
to, at least, uninsured depositors than nonbank corporations.
5The process by which the FDIC resolves failed banks is de-
scribed in Salmon et al. (2003) and Walter (2004).
6The FDIC’s practice of protecting nearly all claimants in large
resolutions before FDICIA gave rise to the misnamed phrase “too
big to fail” (TBTF). Although perhaps not always on a timely basis,
with rare exception, bank regulators did fail insolvent large banks
in terms of terminating their shareholders’ claims and transferring
ownership and management to an assuming institution. Only in
rare instances were insolvent large banks liquidated or closed
physically as well as legally. The more accurate but longer term
would have been “too large not to protect uninsured non-share-
holder claimants.” For a history of TBTF, see Kaufman (2004).
7The case that these restrictive provisions may be insufficient to
prevent future bailouts of uninsured depositors at the very largest
banks is made in Stern and Feldman (2004).
8Because the ex ante costs of administering the insurance compu-
tations when not protecting uninsured depositors are only estimates,
the FDIC has some wiggle room in its determination of which
resolution strategy represents least cost. However, it is likely that
this leeway is significant only for resolving small banks with
small amounts of uninsured deposits.
9As there have not been any very large bank failures since 1992,
this procedure has not been fully tested.
10Failed and resolved banks include all failed institutions insured
by the FDIC through 1989 and by the FDIC’s BIF (Bank Insurance
Fund) in 1990–2002. The population excludes S&Ls but includes
some savings banks. The table excludes 12 relatively small banks
for which loss information was not published by the FDIC. None
of these banks had assets in excess of $500 million. Loss rates are
reported by the FDIC as actual for completed resolutions and as
estimates for resolutions in process. Thus, reported loss rates may
change through time.
11The factors determining resolution losses at individual failed
banks are analyzed in McDill (2004).
12One bank was reported to have been resolved with an eventual
gain. A number of other banks may also have eventually been so
resolved. Any gains are generally returned to subordinated credi-
tors and shareholders.
13The post-FDICIA period starts in 1993 rather than 1992 because
many of the provisions were not scheduled to be implemented
until then (Benston and Kaufman, 1994).
14No adjustment is made for increases in bank size in the second
period from inflation effects per se.
15Legally fraud is difficult to prove and regulators are frequently
cautious in charging it. For example, among other things, NextBank
periodically replaced nonperforming credit card loan—its only
type of loan—with performing loans to collateralize loans that
had been securitized and the resulting bonds sold, so that, contrary
to appearances, it implicitly retained the credit risk of the “sold,”
off-the-balance-sheet loans. When the Comptroller of the Currency
adjusted for this, the bank’s regulatory risk-based capital was re-
duced from 17 percent to 5.4 percent. In addition, the bank appar-
ently knowingly misclassified some credit losses as fraud losses,
so as to avoid increasing loan loss reserves and decreasing reported
capital. Nevertheless, the Inspector General of the Department of
the Treasury concluded that the “failure can be attributed prima-
rily to improperly managed rapid growth that led to unacceptable
high levels of credit risk, losses, and operational problems” rather
than to fraud (U.S. Department of the Treasury, 2002a, p. 5).
Losses to the FDIC from the failure of NextBank are likely to be
significantly larger than estimated at the time of closure because
losses on its credit card loans increased significantly after closure
but before the FDIC both sold the bank-owned portfolio and
stopped servicing the portfolio that had been securitized and paid
the owners of the outstanding bonds (Blackwell, 2002, and FDIC,
2003).
16In part, the FDIC may be expected to experience smaller loss
rates on more recent large bank failures because, since the enact-
ment of depositor preference in 1993, it has priority in liquidation
to nondomestic deposits and other creditor claims, which tend to
be most important at large money center banks. Thus, these funds
absorb losses before they are charged to the FDIC or uninsured
domestic deposits.
17Eisenbeis and Wall (2003) suggest that the regulators may be
confusing minimizing bank failures with minimizing losses from
bank failures and have inappropriately focused on the former at
the expense of the latter. Eisenbeis and Wall also report no evi-
dence that any one federal bank regulatory agency had a better
track record in minimizing failure losses than the others.21 Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago
APPENDIX: ACCOUNTING FOR LOSSES TO THE FDIC IN RESOLVING BANK INSOLVENCIES WITH
DIFFERENT LIABILITY STRUCTURES
Since the enactment of the Depositor Preference Act in 1993,
the FDIC, as receiver, is generally required to pay claims
in insured bank resolutions in the following order as funds
from the sale of the bank and its assets are received, except
if the systemic risk exception that protects some or all de
jure uninsured depositors and/or other creditors at the in-
solvent bank is invoked:
1. Administrative expenses of receiver,
2. Secured claims,
3. Depositors at domestic offices,
4. General unsecured creditors and depositors
at foreign offices,
5. Subordinated debt holders, and
6. Stockholders.
Secured creditors are paid from the proceeds of the associ-
ated collateral. If this is insufficient to satisfy the full claim,
they become general creditors for the remainder. Any ex-
cess collateral is returned to the bank. The FDIC effective-
ly stands in the shoes of insured depositors and has equal
priority with uninsured depositors. Thus, the size of any
loss experienced by the FDIC in resolutions depends both
on the shortfall in the market value of the bank’s assets from
the assigned value of its deposits and other debt and on
the composition of the bank’s liabilities. The former deter-
mines the overall loss and the latter the distribution among
claimants. For example, the relatively less important are
insured deposits, the more the FDIC can share its losses and
the smaller is the loss to the FDIC for any given aggregate
resolution loss. The relationship between bank liability
structure and FDIC loss in resolutions may be demonstrat-
ed at greater length with the use of T accounts for a hypo-
thetical, greatly over-simplified bank balance sheet.
Assume a bank that has only assets (A), insured deposits
(ID), uninsured deposits (UD), unsecured other debt held
by general creditors (OC), and equity capital or net worth
held by shareholders (K). When solvent, its balance sheet
looks as shown in table A1, panel A.
Assume now that the bank experiences a loss of $10.
This can be shown by a $10 charge against assets, reduc-
ing their value from $100 to $90. The balance sheet would
now be as shown in panel B.
Table A1
A) A L




Total 100 100 Total
B) A L




Total 90 90 Total







Any loss is charged first to capital, which can absorb all of
the $10 but is reduced to zero. The bank is declared insolvent
by the FDIC and placed in receivership or sold at any pos-
itive price greater than zero. In this scenario, the FDIC,
depositors, and other creditors do not suffer any loss (panel C).
All the loss is borne solely by the shareholders. This reflects
the theory underlying the closure rule at a nonnegative capi-
tal ratio in FDICIA. If successful, all depositors are fully
protected and deposit insurance is effectively redundant.
But what if the FDIC was not able to resolve the in-
stitution before its losses exceeded its capital? Then some
of the loss has to be charged against stakeholders with higher
priority than shareholders. If the loss were $20, assets would
now decline in value to $80 and capital would be a nega-
tive $10. But limited liability protects the shareholders from
paying this full amount. Instead, they absorb only the first
$10 of the loss, eliminating their ownership interest. The
remaining $10 is charged against the general creditors, who
have the next lowest priority. Depositors would still be
whole and there is no loss to the FDIC. The balance sheet








Total 80 80 Total
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If the loss increases to $30—assets decline to $70—
then depositors would also share in the loss. If the bank
did not qualify for protection under the systemic risk ex-
ception, the additional $10 loss would be shared equally
by the uninsured depositors and the FDIC standing in the
shoes of the insured depositors. Because the FDIC must
make the insured depositors whole at $40 when their de-
posits are valued at only $35, it effectively needs to pay
$5 to the bank. This payment increases the bank’s assets
from $70 to $75 and its balance sheet immediately after
failure may be shown as in table A3, panel A.
Table A3
A) A L




Total 75 75 Total







The FDIC’s loss rate would be calculated by its loss as a
percentage of the bank’s total assets on the date of resolu-
tion before any infusion of funds by the FDIC. In this ex-
ample, this would be $5/$70 or 7.1 percent.
But what if the FDIC obtains a systemic risk excep-
tion for the bank under FDICIA and acts to protect all de-
positors but not other creditors at par value? Then it would
absorb the entire additional $10 loss and inject an additional
$5 payment to the bank to make the uninsured as well as
the insured depositors whole. This would increase assets
from $70 to $80 as in table A4, panel A.
Table A4
A) A L




Total 80 80 Total







The FDIC’s loss rate would double to 14.2 percent
($10/$70).
It is evident that capital, other debt, and uninsured
deposits act as shock absorbers against losses for the FDIC
and that the proportionately greater are these accounts, the
proportionately smaller will be any loss to the FDIC from
resolving a bank with a given negative net worth.
Alternatively, the FDIC may attempt not to fail the
bank legally and invoke SRE to protect the other creditors
as well as the uninsured depositors. Then, except for the
$10 borne by the shareholders, the entire remaining $20
loss would be borne by the FDIC, which would make a
$20 cash infusion to make all nonshareholder claimants
whole. This would increase its loss rate again to 28.4 percent.
The bank balance sheet would read as in table A5, panel A.
Table A5
A) A L




Total 90 80 Total







Lastly, it is also of interest to note how the loss allo-
cations would have differed before the introduction of de-
positor preference in 1993. At that time, the FDIC did not
have priority over other creditors (and deposits at foreign
branches). The FDIC had equal standing with uninsured
depositors and other creditors. Assume that the bank’s
balance sheet was as shown in table A1. A loss of $10
would not have affected the loss allocation. All of this
amount would have been absorbed by the equity holders.
But if the loss was greater than $10, the loss distribution
would have been different. If the loss was $20, the $10
loss not absorbed by the equity holders would be divided
proportionately among the FDIC, standing in the shoes of
the insured depositors, the uninsured depositors, and the
other creditors.1 Each would have suffered a loss of 11
percent ($10/$90). The FDIC would have had to make a
cash infusion of $4.44 (0.11 × $40) to the bank to offset
the loss to the insured deposits. After the infusion, the
balance sheet would have looked like panel A of table A6.23 Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago
Table A6
A) A L




Total 84.44 84.44 Total







The FDIC’s loss rate would be $4.44/$80 or 5.5 percent,
compared with 0 percent after depositor preference. Thus,
the FDIC and the uninsured depositors would both have been
worse off and the other creditors better off (see table A2).
Likewise, if the loss was $30 and the systemic risk
exemption was not invoked, the $20 not borne by the
shareholders would be borne proportionately by the three
other claimant classes. This would compute to 22 percent
($20/$90 = 0.22) of claims of each class. For the FDIC,
this would amount to $8.88. The bank balance sheet
would be as shown in table A7, panel A.
Table A7
A) A L




Total 78.88 78.88 Total







Thus, without depositor preference, the FDIC would have
lost $8.88, or $3.88 more than in table A4, when it lost only
$5.00, and its loss rate would have been 12.7 percent
($8.88/$70), up from 7.1 percent with depositor preference.
1A more thorough analysis of the implications of depositor preference ap-
pears in Kaufman (1997) and Marino and Bennett (1999).24 3Q/2004, Economic Perspectives
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